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M. Siddieq Noorzoy
New Petroleum Discoveries, Past Lessons, EconomicDevelopment and Foreign
Investment in Afghanistan

M. Siddieq Noorzoy
August 12, 2006

The US Geological Survey has been conducting surveys of  northern Afghanistan for
the past four years to ascertain whether there are significant petroleum resources in
the northern provinces for commercial exploitation beyond what was discovered by the
Afghans and the Russians years ago. In a March 2006 report the USGS stated that:
“Using a geology-based assessment methodology, the U.S. Geological Survey–
Afghanistan Ministry of Mines and Industry Joint Oil and Gas Resource Assessment
Team estimated mean volumes of undiscovered petroleum in northern Afghanistan;
the resulting estimates are 1,596 million barrels of crude oil, 15,687 billion cubic feet
of natural gas, and 562 million barrels of natural gas liquids. Most of the undiscovered
crude oil is in the Afghan-Tajik Basin, and most of the undiscovered natural gas is in
the Amu Darya Basin”.        
More recently, Scientific Daily, July, 2006, added on the Internet that:
“Undiscovered petroleum resources in the assessed region of northern Afghanistan
range from 3.581 to 36.462 trillion cubic feet (TCF) of natural gas, with a mean of
15.687 TCF. Estimates of oil range from 0.391 to 3.559 billion barrels (BBO), with a
mean of 1.596 BB0. Estimates for natural gas liquids range from 126 to 1,325 million
barrels (MMB) with a mean of 562 MMB”.
If these estimates are correct, the potential reserves for gas is raised from 5 B.C.F. to
nearly 16 T.C.F. and for oil from a few million barrels to a mean of 1.6 billion and
possibly to 3.6 billion barrels .These finds will not turn Afghanistan into another
petroleum rich Middle Eastern country, they will probably raise foreign government and
commercial interests which in the past wanted to export Central Asian petroleum
resources to the world markets through pipelines across Afghanistan.

Past Reserves, Their Uses and Loss of Revenues From Exports

The oil field at Angot was estimated at 12 million tons of oil, of which 10,000 tons of oil
were produced as early as 1975. Only 5% of the gas reserves at Jarkduk, and  Khwaja
Gogardak was used locally in the fertilizer and power plants in Mazar-i-Sharif according
to the seven year plan ( 1976-1983), with the rest exported to the former USSR. The
heavy dependence on exports especially when it embodied foreign control in the field
of natural gas resulted in significant losses to Afghanistan.
The Russians under paid Afghanistan substantially for its gas exports. For two years
which it was possible to obtain data, including such data from the Russian sources,  
they under paid Afghanistan the total amount of $172.5 million. The exports of gas
amounted to 2.2 B.C.M. ( 78 B.C.F. ) in 1979/80 and 3.0 B.C.M. ( 93 B.C.F. ) in
1980/1981. Based on the price differentials between the agreed prices between
Afghanistan and the former Soviet Union, and what the Russians actually paid
Afghanistan, the loss was estimated at $108.6 million for 1979/1980 and $63.9 million
for 1980/1981. The losses for these years and subsequent years were probably much
more according to the Afghans reporting stating that metering stations determining the
actual quantities of gas exports were inaccessible to the Afghans and only the
Russians reported the quantities.
Interested readers might want to read the sources of data and the more detailed
analysis given in determining these losses in revenue to Afghanistan by referring to an
earlier work:  “Long Term Economic Relations Between Afghanistan and the Soviet
Union: An Interpretive Study”, International Journal of Middle East Studies Vol. 17,
1985, pp.151-173, especially pp.161-163. In that article part of the argument was that
the Russians were covering the costs of the war and the occupation of Afghanistan
significantly through the control and under pricing of Afghan natural gas. It should be
noted that in calculating the revenue losses to Afghanistan world prices for natural gas
were not used. If such prices were to be used the losses would have been even
greater. Our purpose was to show how easy it was to deceive the Afghan government
of the time based on the prices they agreed with the Russians and the prices paid by
them to Afghanistan. It seemed that no one in the Afghan government took the trouble
of investigating the earnings from this important export item which soon outpaced the
annual exports of all other products.  
Had the members of the present regime in Kabul been aware of these facts, and had
the knowledge of the past bilateral economic relations between Afghanistan and the
former Russian-cum-Soviet government, they might have confronted the Russian
government with a large bill for past economic losses Afghanistan had suffered from
its bilateral trade dealings with that country. This certainly would have served
Afghanistan’s interests well when the Russian government presented what
Afghanistan supposedly owed Russia at the donor’s conference in London in 2006.

Total Revenue Losses, Russian Claims and Exports to Afghanistan

If it is assumed that Afghanistan suffered similar losses between 1980/81 and
1991/92  as estimated above when finally the last communist regime fell in April of that
year then it is quite possible that from the exports of natural gas alone the loss in
revenue to Afghanistan amounted to($172.5 m. X 6 + 172.5 m. ) = $1.2075 billion.
Exports of Afghan natural gas started in 1967 with similar pattern in the trade of this
product as far as pricing and control of the quantities of exports were concerned. The
losses  probably were as high as another billion dollars for the years 1967 to 1978/79
since the exports were less. Conservatively, losses amounted to more than $2.2
billion from the export of natural gas by Afghanistan because the country did not have
an effective government and a strong and well informed trade negotiating team.  
The Russian government presenting a bill for $9.8 billion to Afghanistan through the
Paris Club had other large missing peaces of information in it. Interested readers
might want to look at the Soviet export statistics for certain major military related items
presented in another early article “ Soviet Economic Interests in Afghanistan”,
Problems of Communism, May-June issue, 1987, pp.43-54, especially Table 2.  
Between 1979-1984 there were exports of $1.308 billion worth of “machinery,
equipment, transport vehicles”; $485.9 million worth of “aircraft”; $232.5 million worth
of “trucks”; $673.8 million worth of  “petroleum products” and  $ 192.181 worth of
“geological equipment, drilling and extraction”. Clearly much of these exports were
meeting Russian war needs in Afghanistan. But, the exports of geological equipment,
drilling and extraction from the Russian data has left an unanswered question with me
all this time; viz., what were they for, since commensurate export data on minerals from
Afghanistan to the Russians were no where to be found in trade statistics.  
Afghanistan is rich in mineral deposits of various kinds which could be commercially
developed. In the same article above ( Table 3 ) there is list of some 1,400 mineral
deposits of different kinds discovered until the year 1977 which I summarized from the
book,  Mineral Resources of  Afghanistan, Kabul, Ministry of Mines, 1977. Originally this
420 page book was written in Russian and then translated that year by the
sponsorship of the UN.
In its recent dealings with the Russian government, apparently, the members of the
Afghan regime not only did not raise the major issue of war reparations, but, totally
ignored the above kinds of losses from Afghan exports of gas. They also ignored
Russian exports of war related products to Afghanistan which the Russian government
had obviously counted as the part of the debt owed by Afghanistan in its $9.8 billion
bill. There is, of course, another issue here, that is,  the regime in Kabul being
dominated by members of the Northern Alliance and former communists and the
Russians having supported them for many years, at least some of them during 1992-
1996 in the civil war among them, and then all of them during 1996-2001 against the
Taliban, the Russian bill probably contained significant amount of this kind of support
for their clients, which then turned out to be the clients of the US led coalition since the
attack on Afghanistan in October, 2001. This is probably the reason why nothing was
heard about the Russian claims from the Bush Administration, since from the Russian
point of view the US inherited both the cliental and their apparent debt to the Russians.
But, clearly this is not a debt that the Afghan people owed to the Russians. This is an
important issue the Afghan people can pick up anytime in their claims against the
Russian government.

The Need for Energy Development, and Investment Laws

Afghanistan is energy deficient. The availability of energy in any economy is a primary
requisite for its development and growth. Continued imports of oil at current prices will
form a major constraint for the development of public and private enterprises in the
Afghan economy. In fact, the lack of energy such as electricity and security are the main
concerns for present day investors in Afghanistan. Long term assessment of the factor
needs for the Afghan economy will require the development of these new found
petroleum resources both for domestic uses and exports. However, both areas seem
problematic at the present in 2006 since the development of the oil fields will require
the establishment of a refinery which in turn will require significant investment. The
seven year plan, disrupted by the communist coup de tat of April 27, 1978, had
visualized a 200,000 ton oil refinery as part of energy requirements of the country in the
1970’s. The few thousand tons of oil that has been taken out for local use in recent
years largely uses crude methods reported by many Afghans.
The present regime formulated an investment law, which apparently has not been
reviewed by the new Parliament. One of the immediate concerns about this new
investment law is the provision of 100% ownership of industries in Afghanistan by
foreign corporations. Generous tax allowances are also provided for foreign
investment. Yet, in this law there is no mention of the need for the protection of the
Afghan workers, their training, proper compensations, and health care provisions.
Neither is there any provision for the protection of the environment provided which in
the case of petroleum industry or for that matter for other mineral explorations should
be a key concern.
Imagine a large international oil company taking over 100 % control of the
development of the oil and gas fields in northern Afghanistan in conjunction with the
support of the notorious and criminal warlords in the area while a weak regime under
heavy foreign pressure and a fractious Parliament looking on neither of which will be
able to protect the Afghan public or its interests. Afghanistan does not have the needed
personnel in positions of decision making neither the properly working institutions to
protect the public’s interest. Corruption permeates many levels of the present regime
in Kabul. It seems clear that the new investment law had heavy foreign input, and little
knowledgeable domestic input. One does not come across a statement, let alone
inclusion of the provisions of the past foreign and domestic private investment laws
that were passed in 1967 and then revised in 1974, that would remind the Afghan
public about the government’s concern and responsibility in protecting the public’s
interests.  These laws provided for the protection of both public and private consumer
and investment sectors in the Afghan economy while also providing significant
benefits for foreign investment in terms of ownership, repatriation of profits, capital and
tax provisions, as well as, provisions for leasing land in the country.
The 1974 law was critically reviewed under the title, “ An Analysis of the Afghan Foreign
and Domestic Private Investment Law” in Afghanistan Journal, Akademische Druck-u
Verlagsanstalt, Graz, Austria, jg 4, Heft 1, January-February 1977, pp.29-30. That
publication is out of print. Copies of the article may be requested from this writer.
A proper policy framework as far as the development of natural resources is
concerned is to change the investment law  to less than 50% foreign ownership in
order to provide for larger Afghan public participations through the marketing of equity
shares to the general public through an investment type of banking in the absence of a
stock market. They should also ensure that smaller Afghan enterprises have access to
lucrative investment opportunities. One of the requirements for the new law should be
that an exploration and development company should supply the Afghan economy with
refined petroleum products and find export markets for the excess supply at world
prices. Joint venture between domestic investors and foreign investors would probably
serve the interests of Afghanistan better than total foreign ownership.

Foreign Investment, the Development of the Afghan Economy, Some Observations

Afghanistan needs foreign private investment in different areas of the economy. This is
obvious from the lack of a formal and sizeable capital market and the need for the
development of many sectors. Afghanistan has had a money and in some sense an
informal capital market uncontrolled by the usual procedures or laws practiced in other
countries. Clearly growth requirements also require larger supplies of capital. At the
same time, unlike the past governments the present one cannot generate significant
revenues from domestic sources for public investment. Estimates indicate that it
collects less than 5% of the GDP in revenues mostly from the trade sector. The lack of
revenues, and the fact that some 80% of the international financial assistance is
channeled outside the Afghan budgetary and institutional frameworks through NGOs
and direct donor activity seem to have been translated into neglect of the interests of
the people and the country.
There is another factor at play here. The near total dependency of the regime on
foreign financing will obviously not promote government sponsored investment
programs. Given the near failure of policy designed public reconstruction in the last five
years, this issue is also obvious from the economic policies pursued by the
involvement of Western governments and international organizations such as the
World Bank and the International Monetary Fund that these governments promote to
support their policies; these governments and institutions were not interested in
planning a robust reconstruction program in the public sector of the Afghan economy.
One of the fall outs of this policy of unbounded laissez faire on the one hand and at the
same time restrictive public financing in a much distorted war driven economy has
been the lack of effort in reconstructing the physical infrastructure of the country even to
the pre-war levels to support private investment, let alone enlarge the infrastructure in
such areas as road building and power supplies to make the expansion of private
investment possible. Members of the regime are surprised that much significant
enthusiasm has not emerged from possible private investors other than in the highly
lucrative telecommunication which again through the application of foreign inspired
economic policies turned this industry into extremely profitable private duopoly, and at
the same time missed the opportunity to have structured this industry on a public-cum-
private shared  basis to benefit the regime’s budgetary requirements.
Given the tremendous economic needs of Afghanistan in so many different areas,
policy makers cannot afford to open the doors to unlimited accumulation of wealth to a
limited few while the masses suffer from poverty and unemployment and continued
lack of public and private investment in the areas that would remedy these. The private
sector has always been by far the largest area of economic activity in the Afghan
economy even during the era of central planning. Because, agriculture is the largest
sector and will remain so in the foreseeable future and is privately operated, the
Afghan economy will retain its basic structure of privately run businesses. At the same
time Afghan history has shown that private investment in other sectors coupled with
public support and public participation in government sponsored and shared
businesses will perform well.  
Following the examples of the Bank-i-Millie of the 1930’ and 1940’ under the able
guidance of the late Zabuli, who was instrumental  in establishing nearly 100 different
types of investments successfully in different sectors of the Afghan economy ranging
from banking such as the establishment of the Bank-i-Millie itself in 1932 to
manufacturing and trading and agriculture, an investment banking unit might take the
lead at the present by issuing shares in a newly formed national oil and gas firm and
invite the Afghan general public for ownership of 51% of the equity. The rest could
come from foreign private sources of capital.
In the case of petroleum resources there was a national oil company that was at least
put structurally together in the planning efforts of the 1970’s. That kind of effort should
be looked into again instead of turning the development and exports of the petroleum
resources to a 100% owned foreign conglomerate.  If the oil reserves are 3.6 billion
barrels that could open up significant exports of it, and so will the exports of natural
gas if the estimate of 36 B.C.F. is correct. Serious commercial explorations for
petroleum resources have not been carried out in Afghanistan for decades. The
search that led to the above new discoveries in the north were part of the new US
policy initiated after the attack on Afghanistan in October 2001. What is also needed is
a clear policy statement on the part of US policy makers with respect to these new
found resources and further commercial explorations which clearly is some thing that
the Afghan people have the right to know.

US Policies, Regional Petroleum Resources, and Afghanistan’s Position

    US policy makers, both Republican and Democrat, have been interested in gaining
a foothold in the development and exports of the petroleum resources of  Central Asia
and Caucasus ever since the break up of the former Soviet Union in 1991. Greater
opportunities opened for US firms to get involved in oil deals as the region developed
an outwardly perspective which created new information where the new markets for
these resources could be and both the capital and technology to develop and export
these resources were available. It was also increasingly becoming clear that the
countries of the region having experienced Soviet state controls limiting their shares of
revenues and exercising monopoly controls over the transport of these resources in
Russian owned pipelines, they were looking for alternative routes.
    Given these developments and the insatiable US appetite for oil and a strategy of
securing petroleum resources for US allies, while at the same time attempting to
reduce the monopoly position that Russia enjoyed in the transport of the Caspian
region and Central Asia petroleum resources, the US has been participating in the
construction of some of the pipelines. Untangling the web of the existing and proposed
pipelines in these regions require a separate discussion. The web site www.ela.doe.
gov reported in July 2002 the list of some nineteen such oil and gas pipelines. The
Baku-Tbilisi-Cyhan (BTC)  pipeline taking oil from Azerbaijan to Turkey across Georgia
is one, and the South Caucus Pipeline (SCP) transporting gas along the same route is
another that the US has actively encouraged and participated in.  
During the reign of the Taliban regime there were discussions of two pipelines
running from Turkmenistan in western Afghanistan to Pakistan and beyond, one
carrying oil and the other carrying natural gas. More prominently mentioned was the
“centgas”  taking 700 BCF of gas yearly from Dualatabad in Turkmenistan via Heart to
Multan a distance of 870 miles. Memorandum of understanding had been signed by
Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan Afghanistan and Pakistan. The US oil company Unocal was
keenly interested in this project. So was the Clinton Administration. This is one of the
options that apparently the US policy makers still favor in competition with another
pipeline running from Iran to Pakistan and India.
But, given the rising resistance to the presence of foreign military forces in Afghanistan
especially in the south and constantly reoccurring fighting between the warlords
Rashid Dostum and Abdul Malik in the north along with insecurity elsewhere in the
country, no international oil consortium has stepped forward to offer to build these
pipelines. The recent discussions between Turkmenistan, Afghanistan and Pakistan
have not led to firm agreements and involvement of international financial backing for
the proposed pipelines.  
Furthermore, if the US led coalition and some members of NATO most notably the
British and Canada plan to carry on warfare in southern Afghanistan to ‘bring
democracy’ as they claim, which in the view of the silent majority is bound to fail at
great costs, it is difficult to see how the development of the petroleum resources of
Afghanistan can take place any time soon. Major changes in the policies of these
countries are required, which should include an all inclusive peace and participation
by all the different segments of the Afghan population in the affairs of the country, and a
time table for the withdrawal of all foreign military forces and an end to the occupation
of the country.
The policies of aggressive militarism followed by the US led coalition and now
members of NATO against a war torn country, which honors its history in defending its
soil as clearly shown in the wars against the British and the Russians and their
successive defeats, should have been seen as unworkable. Given this kind of policy
which has been carried out by countless high flying bombing missions against
villages and rural areas which in the process have killed thousands of innocent
Afghans coupled with failed policies in nearly all other areas ranging from
reconstruction to controlling corruption and the rise of drug production and rising
poverty, unemployment and lack of proper care of the refugees and the poor all have
created a new national feeling among the Afghan people which leads to the
conclusion that the foreign countries have had their own agenda which embodied
collective punishment of the Afghan people especially the Pushtuns. Not only a
general war of attrition has been carried out against the Pushtun areas during the last
five years, but, these areas have suffered from the lack of any international assistance,
spread of poverty and malnutrition leading to the increase of certain deceases such as
tuberculoses. There are 200,000  IDPs and more are added daily in these areas.  
The Pushtun areas in Afghanistan were targeted by foreign political intrigues and
agents provocateurs before the events of September 11, 2001. In fact, the attack on
Afghanistan was planned under the Clinton Administration. There is much widely
available evidence for this. What is revealing according to the investigative writings of
the authors of the Forbidden Truth, is that the reason for attacking Afghanistan had to
do with disagreements with the Taliban government over issues which involved
terrorism, but, also interests in Central Asian petroleum resources. Even the Clinton
Administration did not lose sight of the importance of the access to the petroleum
resources through Afghanistan. See, Forbidden Truth, by Jean-Charles Brisard and
Guillaume Dasquie, Thunder’s Mouth Press/Nation Books, paper edition, New York,
2002, especially pp.29-46. See, Frederick Starr’s article in Washington Post,
December 19, 2000, who detailed the Clinton Administration’s plan.  See also, Patrick
Martin, WSWS News & Analysis, November 20, 2001, referenced by Bruce G.
Richardson reviewing the book, Forbidden Truth, in Afghanistan Mirror, Vol. 18, No.
103, pp.1-3. Bruce G. Richardson’s review of the book Forbidden Truth, also appears
in the Afghan Post, May, 2006 issue, page 25.
The Pushtuns as the majority people in Afghanistan, whose population base is
estimated by different sources between 55-67% of the total population, cannot be
expected to be under attack, and excluded by foreign generated policies from
economic benefits from any expected development of and exports of the new
petroleum resources. Before it is argued that the new resources are in the north and
belong to the region, it must be pointed out that under Afghan law mineral resources
any where in the country are public property and belong to all the people. In the past
there were also some explorations in the Katawaz, Helmand and Farah regions of the
country. Present state of warfare will not permit restarting these explorations. But, this
presents another reason why new policies are needed for the economic development
of Afghanistan.
Under peaceful conditions clearly Afghanistan would benefit significantly if the
“centgas” pipeline is built both from the exports of its excess supplies of petroleum
resources and from the royalties that it could obtain from the exports of gas from
Turkmenistan and oil from Uzbekistan. Although it seems that the recently opened
pipeline (BTC) from Azerbaijan and its extension from Turkmenistan moving gas
supplies under the Caspian Sea would open new markets for the Central Asian
petroleum resources in Turkey and to Europe. However, it is clear that the immediate
northern neighbors of Afghanistan, most notably Turkmenistan would gain significant
new markets for its huge reserves of natural gas also through another pipeline
running across Afghanistan to Pakistan and beyond.
Another idea that was explored in the past was that if a pipeline is built through
western Afghanistan the northern domestic supplies of petroleum resources could
reach significant domestic markets and future industries in other areas of the Afghan
economy. From the economic point of view this seemed workable if for example a
given supply of domestic natural gas is fed to the common pipeline and then taken out
down stream for domestic use. The feasibility of this would require assessment by
petroleum engineers.

A New Outlook for US Policies, the Present Regime and Future One’s Responsibilities

It is time that the decision makers in Kabul, what ever their shades of personal and
party politics, study the past and present economic policies in Afghanistan and protect
the interests of the Afghan people foremost in any internationally binding business
dealings. This reminder is necessary given both because of the past trading
experiences Afghanistan has had with the Russians, and the fact that the present
regime in Kabul failed to protect the claims of millions of Afghans impacted by the war
during 1979-1989 against the Russian-cum-Soviet government. In accepting the
Russian claims presented to it at the January-February 2006 London donor
conference this regime has betrayed the trust of the Afghan people. It is also
necessary to state the obvious that Afghanistan is under military occupation by the US
led coalition and NATO and its domestic and foreign policies are subject to heavy
influences. In fact, it seems that the regime in Kabul has little say based on the reports
that come out about events in Afghanistan decided by foreign interests which also has
become the key factor in the thinking of the Afghan people about the future of the
The rising resistance to these conditions most dramatically demonstrated in the
growing support for the neo-Taliban, or as some would call them the neo-mujahideen
composed of many groups of former mujahideen and Taliban is the outcome which
the Kabul based think tank Sensil Council http://www.senliscouncil.net  concludes in
its latest report of September, 2006 that the Taliban now control half of Afghanistan.
The new discoveries of the petroleum resources in Afghanistan can not become
another excuse for the continued occupation of the country as some have suggested.
The US support for the development of petroleum resources of the Caspian and
Central Asian regions as an alternative competing source of supply to OPEC for the
Western markets is what sound policy making dictates. It is clearly to the benefit of the
producer and consumer countries. However, it is quite another kind of policy
embedded in 19th century outlook to occupy a country, such as Afghanistan as some
have suggested, to make sure to have access to its resources. If policy makers in the
West encourage free markets and competition in the world, which are noble goals,
they cannot turn around and argue that the free market and competition model does
not apply to the development of petroleum resources. This kind of double vision is
clearly based on a fault line of history, which present world developments with major
players both on the supply and demand sides for petroleum resources would consider
as a costly and failing policy.
It has become amply clear to any observer watching the world markets for oil and gas
at the present that no country, including Saudi Arabia the largest oil producing country,
can control world prices and total outputs for these resources. The market forces are
too complex and too large for any kind of the type of controls that were exercised even
by OPEC a few decades ago. Russia is the second largest producer and is not a
member of OPEC, and it will maximize its profits from its resources based on the
market conditions. On the demand side, China as a consumer with the second largest
economy in the world, with $8.5 trillion GDP (PPP) as compared to the US GDP of
$12.4 trillion according to the World Bank calculations, ( when its GDP is measured in
terms of purchasing power parity which is relevant for this comparison ), clearly has
large influence on world markets and prices, especially with a growth rate of more than
11%. The way China is meeting its demand for petroleum resources is to sign long
term contracts with Central Asian, African and South American countries to ensure
supplies for its explosive economy. China is applying the rules of the market place to
meet its growth requirements and in fact is setting an example for other countries to
Thus, if there is a clear trend in the production and supplies of petroleum resources in
the world to meet the growing demand for these resources, the West cannot afford to
rely on the past policies of direct control of these resources in other parts of the world
to ensure their supplies to their economies. What is needed is both the development
of alternative energy sources and a policy of encouraging competition in the supplies
of the petroleum resources from different parts of the world to meet the growing
The Afghan policy makers must make sure that the interests of the Afghan people are
protected in any new international petroleum deal. Since the majority Pushtuns so far
have born the brunt of the costs of the so-called war on terror and the costs of the
occupation policies, it is difficult to see how any foreign and Afghan policy makers
succeed in implementing new policies on resource development and exports without
the participation and full consent and agreement of the Pushtuns. Foreign made
policies and military occupation have never worked in Afghanistan. Time for diplomacy
and an end to war have arrived out of necessity for the common good and an end to
the military occupation of Afghanistan to follow.
Furthermore, any participating international petroleum company or consortium would
want security guarantees for the construction and maintenance of the proposed
pipelines. This kind of security can only exist when the people at large are participating
in the economic benefits being generated, not necessarily by the deployment of
military or police force on a permanent basis.
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